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or within real experiment [Chen, Javidi et al. (2014)]. Such key characteristics can be following: a wavelength of 
laser radiation, a pixel size of the amplitude object, propagation distances [Situ, Zhang (2004)] in the free space 
before and after the second phase mask, the spatial phase distribution of the second random phase mask. In some 
variations of the method DRPE additional (or alternate) characteristics can also be used as key parameters, for 
example: polarization properties of the radiation or fractional Fourier orders [Unnikrishnan, Singh (2000)] before 
and after the focal plane of the lens. Consequently, all parameters of the optical scheme acting as an unknown key to 
the potential attacker. 
The cryptanalysis of the encryption strength of algorithms always needs to make the assumption, that a potential 
attacker knows the applied encryption algorithm and some other data. Significantly accelerated numerical method in 
comparison with the direct brute-force attack was proposed within such assumptions on the basis of the revealed 
vulnerability of the DRPE. It allows to break the data encrypted with DRPE for a satisfactory time. The analysis of 
the cryptographic security of the DRPE method was performed in the works [Carnicer et al. (2005); Peng, Wei et al. 
(2006); Peng et al. (2007); Peng, Zhang et al. (2006); Frauel et al. (2007); Qin, Peng (2009); Qin, He et al. (2009)]. 
Revealed weakness of the DRPE algorithm are based on the assumptions that the attacker knows the applied 
encryption algorithm and he has access to one or more pairs of source and encoded images [Qin, He et al. (2009)]. 
Attention of researchers was focused on the further investigation or development of such attacks [Peng, Wei et al. 
(2006); Peng et al. (2007); Peng, Zhang et al. (2006); Frauel et al. (2007); Qin, He et al. (2009); Qin, Peng (2009)]. 
It is known, that due to the multidimensionality of the encryption and decryption, numerical methods for 
breaking the DRPE data with brute-force attack cannot be used at this time because of the high computational 
complexity of such task. Nevertheless, to our best knowledge, usually an unsuccessful methodology is employed to 
provide the analysis of the computational complexity of the brute-force attack on the data encrypted by the DRPE 
method: the direct compare of restored images with the source image was implemented to evaluate the 
computational complexity of the DRPE method. In this context it is obvious, that if someone has a direct access to 
the original image, inherently there is no any need to apply some breaking algorithms. On the other hand, without 
any access to the original image, there is a requirement for some criterion or criteria to check the correctness of the 
chosen combination of parameters on each iteration of the cycle of the breaking algorithm of the numerical brute-
force attack. In this instance, the accuracy and the computational complexity of the brute-force attack with such 
criteria will be different from the described case with the direct comparison. In this paper, we proposed simple and 
reliable criteria to give feedback in the brute-force attack on DRPE, allowing to perform more accurate 
investigations of the particularities of such numerical task. In general, proposed criteria can also be useful for other 
methods relating to image encryption. 
2. Proposed criteria to give a feedback in the brute-force attack on DRPE 
From numerical research conducted in this paper, it is clear that to use the brute-force method the attacker not 
only needs to know the encryption algorithm, he also required some a priori-known information about the source 
image or images. In contrast to the described above methods of cracking DRPE based on the use of its 
vulnerabilities, in this case there is no need to direct access to pairs of the original and encrypted images. In this 
instance, only some general information about the images (e.g. type of the images: binary, picture, text) and/or any 
properties and original image characteristics (statistical or otherwise) may serve as a priori-known information. The 
requirement for a priori information is explained by necessity to verify somehow whether the decrypted image is 
restored well for each sequential change of the key parameters of the optical scheme at each iteration of the breaking 
process. From there, it is evident, that there is a need in any reasonably adequate criteria, which should be based on 
some information about the original image or images (if they are single-type images). We describe four proposed 
criteria in the following subsections. 
2.1. The criterion based on the known statistical distribution of the original data 
Statistical analysis may be selected as the 1st of the proposed criteria, if the statistical distribution of the original 
data follows the known law. For example, may be known, that the distributions of the original images corresponds 
to the Gaussian noise fairly accurate, which can be explained due to the peculiarities of the algorithm used to 
 S.S. Nalegaev and N.V. Petrov /  Physics Procedia  73 ( 2015 )  281 – 286 283
prec
itera
imag
limit
know
way 
distr
2.2.
histo
W
tone
incre
of th
imag
com
line 
spec
show
or m
with
of th
num
be u
such
neig
the r
 
Fig. 1
halfto
halfto
the sa
distrib
T
in F
obta
Mac
632.
phas
 
 
 
oding them as
tion of the br
e must be clo
s of the stan
n fairly accu
to implement
ibution in the
The criterion 
gram is grea
hen a binary
 image is used
asing essenti
e restored im
es is less tha
bination of th
form, when 
trum of the h
n that with s
ore (see Fig. 
 a number of 
is histogram
erical DRPE 
sed for the ac
 instance, the
hboring discr
ecovery, whe
. The schematic
nes of the image
nes of the image
me image with 
utions of the Ga
he example o
ig. 2, where t
ined for the D
h-Zehnder in
8 nm; pixel s
e distribution
 an illustratio
ute-force atta
se to the bell
dard deviatio
rate, it can m
 this criterion
 reconstructed
based on the 
ter than the n
 image is use
 with dynam
ally, because 
ages. As a pr
n 8 bit. The h
e parameters 
the paramete
istogram can
mall modifica
1b,c). In the c
counts larger
-based criter
method or by
curate recons
 number N of
ete amplitude
n reconstructi
 description of th
 (4 bit color dep
 (8 bit, 256) is e
the magnified t
ussian white nois
f the applicat
he depth of c
RPE in the F
terferometer 
ize 2.8 ȝm; 1
 in the object 
n. In this case
ck to success
 curve for the
n or mean v
ake the criter
, in general i
 images. 
enlarged sam
umber of the h
d as a source
ic range < 8-b
an additional 
iori known in
istogram of t
will have a di
rs are movin
 be used as a
tions, this cri
ase of this mo
 than the num
ion is limite
 experimenta
truction only 
 halftones in t
 levels becom
on is perform
  
e proposed crite
th, 16 halftones) 
qual to the numb
wo times sampl
e (64×64 pixels)
ion of the hist
olor of the so
resnel domain
with phase s
st and 2nd fre
plane. 
, someone ca
ful hack the 
 correct set o
alue of the d
ia faster and m
t should be po
pling frequen
alftones in th
 as in [Nomu
it (less than 2
criterion can 
formation her
he restored im
stinct discrete
g away from
reliable and 
terion can be 
dification of 
ber of halfto
d only by c
l errors, if the
in a case with
he original im
es equal (or l
ed with corre
rion based on th
is less than the n
er of the counts o
ing frequency. T
. 
ogram-based 
urce image w
 [Chen, Javid
hifting digita
e space propa
n verify the h
encrypted da
f all key param
istributions o
ore precise. 
ssible to use
cy of the histo
e original im
ra et al. (200
56 halftones
be constructe
e can serve o
age generate
 line spectrum
 the proper c
accurate crite
used for any 
the criterion, 
nes in the sou
omputational 
 classical sch
 an extremel
age is so larg
ess) to the mi
ct set of param
e enlarged samp
umber of the cou
f the histogram 
he histograms (
criterion can 
as 5 bit (32 
i et al. (2014
l holography 
gation distan
istogram shap
ta: the histog
eters of the 
btained with 
The analysis 
 any suitable 
gram: the nu
ages 
0); Barrera et
), the probabi
d on the basis
nly the fact, t
d with 256 co
 (Fig. 1a), w
ombination. 
rion to recov
grayscale ima
the histogram
rce image. T
errors of th
eme of DRP
y high depth 
e, that the ha
nimal comput
eters of the o
  
ling frequency o
nts of its histogr
(256 counts);. (c
a-b) were obtain
be seen from 
 halftones). T
); Situ, Zhan
and followin
ces 1 and 2 m
e of the resto
ram shape of
optical schem
such precodi
of the histogr
representation
mber of the c
 al. (2013)] o
lity of an accu
 of a simple h
hat the depth 
unts for the 
hich gradually
Thus, the lin
er the encryp
ges, including
s must be art
he possibility
e encryption 
E is used. Th
of color of th
lf of the diffe
ational or exp
ptical schem
f the histogram:
am (256 counts)
) enlarged fragm
ed from the im
our numerica
he results fro
g (2004)] usin
g key param
m, correspon
red image on
 the reconstru
e. If the stati
ng algorithm
am is not the
s of the stati
ounts of the 
r any similar 
rate restorati
istogram ana
of color of so
case of the co
 deviates fro
e structure o
ted data. It ca
 8-bit color d
ificially calcu
 of the applic
algorithm o
e criterion ca
e source imag
rence betwee
erimental err
e. 
 (a) the number 
; (b) the number 
ent of the histogr
ages with the ra
l results prese
m the Fig. 2 
g a scheme o
eters: wavele
dingly; flat i
 each 
cted 
stical 
 also 
 only 
stical 
half-
on is 
lysis 
urce 
rrect 
m its 
f the 
n be 
epth 
lated 
ation 
f the 
n not 
e. In 
n the 
or of 
 
of the 
of the 
am of 
ndom 
nted 
were 
f the 
ngth 
nitial 
284   S.S. Nalegaev and N.V. Petrov /  Physics Procedia  73 ( 2015 )  281 – 286 
Fig. 
param
the w
imag
2.3.
A
ima
the 
 
Fig. 
case 
I
the 
in th
will
2. Histograms fr
eters of the opt
avelength: b) 63
e (i) with amplitu
The criterion
nother additi
ges are used, 
result of this o
3. The schematic
of the redundant
n the input im
same. In this 
e restored im
 increase itsel
om the original i
ical scheme with
2.8 nm (correct 
de distribution o
 based on the
onal criterion
for example, 
peration is u
 description of t
 precoding of the
age, the scal
case, the aver
age may be u
f in the event
  
  
  
mage (a) and im
in the process of
value); c) 632.7 
f the wavefront 
 enlarged sam
 for the accur
when the ope
sed as the inp
he proposed crite
 original data obt
e of which w
age deviation
sed as a crite
 of deviation 
ages, restored fr
 decryption were
nm; d) 632.6 nm
of optical radiatio
pling frequen
ate data reco
ration of a sim
ut (digitally e
rion based on th
ained with the si
as increased b
 of the amplit
rion. It will ha
from the corr
om the data encr
 set correctly (eq
; e) 632.4 nm; f
n in the object p
cy in the spa
very can be a
ple nearest-
nlarged) imag
e enlarged samp
mple nearest-nei
y m times, th
ude of all pix
s a minimum
ect parameter
  
  
  
ypted by DRPE 
ual to values use
) 632 nm; g) 631
lane (5-bit color 
tial domain 
pplied, if a re
neighbor upsc
es in a metho
 
ling frequency in
ghbor upscaling. 
e amplitude w
els within suc
 with correct 
s. It should be
with digital holo
d in the process o
 nm; h) 532 nm
depth, resolution
dundant preco
aling is perfo
d DRPE (see 
 the spatial dom
ithin each ar
h areas from 
parameters us
 noted, that th
graphy (b-h), wh
f encryption) ex
. The original gr
 64×64 pixels). 
ding of the s
rmed to them
Fig. 3). 
ain, for example
ea m × m pix
their average 
ed to recover
ere is a poss
 
 
 
ere all 
cept of 
ayscale 
ource 
, and 
, in the 
els is 
value 
y and 
ibility 
 S.S. Nalegaev and N.V. Petrov /  Physics Procedia  73 ( 2015 )  281 – 286 285
to ap
the e
wav
with
men
disad
from
samp
than
the w
2.4.
T
know
then
attac
char
and 
Fig. 
mod
grad
the c
sign
Fig. 4
case o
3. C
D
DRP
com
calcu
deve
In
meth
was 
data 
ply a similar
nlarged samp
efront image 
out changing 
tioned criterio
vantage asso
 the increase
ling frequen
 a half of the 
avefront pro
The criterion 
he last from t
n spatial stru
 it will allow
ker. This is 
acteristic elem
structure. Fun
4. Other mod
el 1 [ISO/IE
ually appear i
orrect set of
al to noise rat
. The schematic 
f the usage of th
onclusion 
ue to the mul
E through th
plexity of thi
lation for a 
lopment of th
 our work, w
od using bru
considered as
follows the k
 approach rel
ling frequenc
restored from
the paramete
n based on th
ciated with t
d size of the 
cy in the spat
wavelenth of 
pagation. 
based on the 
he proposed c
ctures. For ex
 to make easi
because of th
ents (functio
ctional region
els of the QR
C 18004:200
n the reconstr
 parameters. 
io in these are
description of th
e QR-codes as th
tidimensiona
e direct brute
s task. How
satisfactory 
e working pro
e have propo
te-force nume
 a part of thi
nown law. A
ated with the
y of the hist
 the hologr
r of the phys
e analysis of
he increased 
input data. In
ial domain. T
the light (Ȝ/2
known spatia
riteria can be
ample, if QR
er the accura
e fact, that 
nal regions w
s of the exam
-code also ex
0]. Accordin
ucted image,
In this case, 
as of the ima
e proposed criter
e original images
lity of the enc
 force attack
ever, new co
time potentia
totype of a q
sed four crite
rical attack. A
s work. It  ca
nother criterio
artificially in
ogram, but in
am should b
ical size of th
 the areas of 
computationa
 addition, it h
his limit is e
), if the scalar
l structures w
 applied for t
-codes are us
te data recov
the QR-code
ith control fo
ple of the QR
ists with som
gly, the patte
 as the curren
additional cri
ge with the co
ion based on the
. 
ryption and d
can not be u
mputing syst
lly can be e
uantum comp
ria for guaran
 criterion ba
n be used for
n is based on
creased numb
 the spatial d
e enlarged u
is spatial dis
m × m pixels
l complexity 
as to be cons
xplained with
 diffraction t
ithin the orig
he accurate d
ed as source i
ery using bru
s are binary 
oting) locate
-code model
e differences 
rn of such c
t set of param
teria can be 
rresponding f
 known spatial s
ecryption pro
sed in the pr
ems capable 
ngineered in
uter. 
teed and acc
sed on the st
 the recovery
 the enlarged
er of the cou
omain. In thi
sing the sim
tribution. In 
 can be used.
of the numer
idered, that t
 the fact, tha
heory is used 
inal images 
ata recovery, 
mages, as pro
te-force meth
images, but 
d in strongly 
 2 [ISO/IEC 
in its structur
haracteristic 
eters of the o
applied, for 
unctional reg
tructures within 
cess, numeri
esent time, b
to perform a
 the future, 
urate recover
atistical analy
, if the statis
 sampling fre
nts as in the 
s instance, the
ple nearest-n
such a situati
However, the
ical calculati
here is a limi
t the pixel si
for the nume
if the origina
posed in [Bar
od, if this fac
also they con
defined place
18004:2006.] 
e: micro QR-c
elements of 
ptical scheme
example, the 
ions of the QR
 
the original imag
cal methods o
ecause of a h
ll required o
in the case 
y of data encr
sis of the rec
tical distributi
quency of the
criterion base
 resolution o
eighbor upsc
on, the previo
re is a signif
on, which de
t of increasin
ze can not be
rical simulati
l images has 
rera et al. (20
t is known t
tain a numb
s with known
can be seen i
ode and QR-
the QR-code
 is approachi
calculation o
-code. 
es, for example,
f the breakin
igh computat
perations for
of the succe
ypted with D
onstructed im
on of the ori
 histogram. W
d on 
f the 
aling 
usly 
icant 
rives 
g the 
 less 
on of 
some 
13)], 
o the 
er of 
 size 
n the 
code 
 will 
ng to 
f the 
 in the 
g the 
ional 
 this 
ssful 
RPE 
ages 
ginal 
hen 
286   S.S. Nalegaev and N.V. Petrov /  Physics Procedia  73 ( 2015 )  281 – 286 
the number of the counts of the histogram of the restored image is greater than the number of the halftones in the 
original image, the discrete line spectrum on the histogram corresponds to the precise reconstruction. The other two 
criteria use the analysis related to the spatial domain of the restored images: it is the criterion based on the enlarged 
sampling frequency in the spatial domain and the criterion based on the existence of the known spatial structures in 
the original images. For example these criteria will be useful in the case of QR-codes or the redundant precoding of 
the source images. In contrast to the known techniques for the numerical breaking DRPE data without use of the 
brute-force method, there is no need of a direct access to the pairs of the source and encrypted images to use the 
proposed criteria. Some a priori known information about the source images is only necessary: color depth (for the 
criterion based on the analysis of the histogram), the size of the area of m × m (when the redundant precoding of 
data is used) or just the fact of the usage of the QR-codes. All proposed criteria can be applicable not only in the 
grayscale case, but also in the case of the color imaging, when each color channel contains the separated encrypted 
image of the source data. 
In this work, we only want to demonstrate a particular way of looking at the problem of the breaking DRPE data, 
and we want to present some arguments in favor of that way. 
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